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Beyond Stability, towards Order
Scott Burchill and Damien Kingsbury*
Although Indonesia is Australia's
largest and most important neighbour,
the relationship between the two
profoundly different societies has been
punctuated by bouts of high tension,
suspicion and mutual mistrust. Despite
Australia's diplomatic support for the
de-colonisation of the Dutch East
Indies after the Second Wond War,
Canberra and Jakarta have
experienced a troubied diplomatic
relationship virtually since Indonesia's
independence (Lee 2001). Attempts to
resolve enduring problems have been a
recurring theme in Australian diplomacy
and academia since the 1950s. And
yet despite considerable effort on both
sides, remarkably little progress has
been made in constructing a long-term
engagement which satisfies the
aspirations of both peoples.
This paper seeks to identify some of
the structural faults in the relationship
and explore the opportunities and limits
of future cooperation. It will be argued
that before a more mutually satisfactory
and successful relationship can be
built, new foundations of understanding
will need to be laid. This presupposes
recognising earlier faults which have
periodically led to diplomatic cracks in
the relationship and prevented enduring
levels of civility from developing. From
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an Australian perspective, this paper
assesses the prospects of co-existence
between two independent, differing
politiGal communities.
Poor investment
For much of the period since the
1950s, Canberra has underestimated
the extent to which Indonesian
nationalism was part of a broader
'revo~ against the West' and a reaction
to the colonial mission civilisatrice.
Indonesia's political aspirations,
expressed in the traditional Western
discourse of self-determination,
sove-eignty and independence,
led many Australian policy-makers
to believe that the newly independent
state would imitate the Western route
to political modernisation (BUll 1984).
They were soon disappointed.
Ignorance, divergent strategic
interests, suspicion of
communist sympathies and a
legacy ofracism combined to
push Ausn-alia away from its
large northern neighbow:
Ignorance, divergent strategic interests,
suspicion of communist sympathies
and a legacy of racism combined to
push Australia away from its large
nortr·em neighbour. In Indonesia•
hosti ity towards the West, of which
Australia was seen as an outpost,
together with assertions of 'nationalist'
unity, frequently situated Indonesia
against Australia.
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By the early 1960s President Sukarno
was seen in Canberra as a dangerous
ultra-nationalist, econornically
incornpetent, anti-Western and a likely
conduit for eventual communist rule,
given the broad-based popularity of the
Indonesian Cornmunist Party (PKI) and
his increasing support for it. Sukarno's
demise and the annihilation of the PKI
by Major-General Suharto in 1965-66
was therefore warmly welcomed in the
West (see, for example, Burchill 2001).
Suharto's pathological anti-communism
and his decision to open up the
economy to Western capital was as
rnuch appreciated as his iron grip of
a contrived and inherently fragmentary
state. For the next three decades
Suharto was cast in the West as the
only person who could prevent a return
to the chaos of the late Sukarno period,
and secure Indonesia against
Communism. His repression and
corruption were easily forgiven.
The move to a militarily dominated
authoritarian government which came
to power in a massacre of horrific
proportions was a problematic start,
but Jakarta's bloody and clumsy
invasion of East Timor in 1975 and the
lies it and Canberra subsequently told
about the situation there, along with
repression and censorship throughout
the archipelago, showed that Indonesia
and Australia were developing along
fundamentally different political paths.
Misreadings
From the perspective of Australia's
policy-makers, Indonesia is viewed as
densely populated, strategically vital,
regionally influential and inherently fragile.
This last point is reflected in constant
calls by many Australian 'Indonesianists'
to support the unity of the Indonesian
state. What they failed to recognise,
however, was that, fragmented,
federated or non-existent, Canberra's
concerns remained irrelevant to
Indonesia's actual political development.
What it did demonstrate was Canberra's
own anxiety about Indonesia (see, for
example, Mackie 2001).
This anxious reading of its modern
history meant that Indonesia has never
been 'normalised' in Canberra's
international relations, instead
occupying an exceptional status in
,;ustralia's diplomatic and academic
cultures. In one way or another,
Indonesia has been regarded as a
perpetual concern for Australia-a
problem to contain - for which special
allowances had to be made.
Canberra s concerns remained
irrelevanl 10 Indonesia sactual
political development.
One consequence of this anxiety led
the Menzies Government in the mid
'1 950s to make provision for Indonesian
:;tudies at universities in Melbourne,
:3ydney and Canberra, and the
cultivation of what was thought to be a
:;ignificant body of expertise in the area.
Yet despite having a large number of
Indonesian scholars in Australia who
have had considerable influence on the
lormation of government thinking in
Canberra, there have been numerous
mistakes and surprisingly few benefits
10 show for this intellectual investment.
In part this can be explained by the
concentration of most of these 'experts'
on culture as the key method for
understanding Indonesia. This culturalist
approach went far beyond
anthropology, pervading the disciplines
of politics, history and even the
'science' of economics. Yet this
approach has rarely been used to
analyse other, especially Western,
:;ocieties. Whereas the West is
understood through its history and
politics, the East is said to be best
understood through its culture
(Legge 1990).
As they see it, the challenge for most
'Indonesianists' has been to uncover
the deep significance of Indonesian
(read Javanese) culture in understanding
Indonesian politics and society which
:;hould, in turn, direct how Australia
:;hould engage Indonesia. It's an
essentialist and Orientalist outlook
(Robison 1986, 1996).
Past mistakes
There are, however, serious problems
with such Orientalist understanding.
It helps to reinforce and reproduce
notional differences between the Orient
(Indonesia) and the Occident (Australia),
differences that may well be illusory or
simply artificially constructed by the
West for its own purposes (Steadman
1969, Said 1979, Turner 1978). 'Our'
civilisation is always known, accepted
and normal. 'Theirs' is different, strange
and exotic. Religions, races and
ethnicities are collapsed into broad
reductive categories, sweeping
generalisations, and rigidly separated
national cultures which are assumed
to be fixed rather than dynamic.
'Our' civilisation is always
known, accepted and normal.
'Theirs 'is different, strange
and exotic.
Orientalist approaches, such as those
adopted by a number of Australia's
Indonesian 'experts', have confused
the notion of 'culture' with the social,
political and economic interests of the
ruling elite in a country (Pemberton
1994). In the case of Indonesia,
this constituted a conflation of
predominantly Javanese culture
(reconstructed as state culture) and the
culture of authoritarianism associated
with the New Order regime of Suharto
(which in turn derives from the
'or9anicist' (fascist) origins of
Indonesian state philosophy). The
reification of Javanese culture stresses
harmony, deference and obedience,
hierarchy, conformity and the avoidance
of conflict in Indonesian society. The
state philosophy emphasises 'state
rights' over individual (or community)
rights (Bourchier 1996, Moejodjanto
1996, Mangunwijaya 1992).
However, all of this fails to adequately
account for the diversity of interests
and ideologies which exist in
Indonesia. Harmony and order do
exist, but so too do conflict, dissent
and opposition, centre and periphery,
Islam and secularism, the unitary state
and the communal group, reform and
entrenched interests, extremes of
wealth and poverty.
On this basis, Suharto:S
repressive rule was excused
and defended.
The mistake of many has been to
presuppose an 'idealised' notion of
Indonesian culture and base political
judgements upon it. For example, it
was asserted by some Indonesianists
that Indonesians are uncomfortable
with Western concepts of liberal
democracy and prefer strong rule to
fit their dependent personalities and
unitary political needs. On this basis,
Suharto's repressive rule was excused
and defended. However, this argument
was contradicted by popular support
for the fall of Suharto in May 1998 and
the process of political reform which
followed. Until this was too
overwhelmingly obvious to refute,
many of Australia's Indonesian 'experts'
insisted that all was basically well with
the Indonesian body politic.'
Culturally relative arguments for 'Asian
values' in the West, the essence of
Orientalist thought, have also been
played back to the West by
authoritarian leaders in East Asia who
object to the 'imposition' of Western
values and institutions. Given their
experience of European colonialism,
it is unsurprising that East Asian
leaders portray the West's human
rights'agenda' as a thinly disguised
form of cultural imperialism. The
identification of human rights with the
West provides a number of them with
effective immunity from both internal
and external criticism.
1 One regrettable and distorting manifestation of this
approach has been the close identification of many
AustraHan academics and diplomats with other
societies, especially Asian societies. In his
autobiography, Bill Hayden noted that shortly after
beeoming foreign minister in 1983, he 'detected a
preference among some to be overly agreeable
towards certain outside interests and accordingly not
independent enough in catering for the national
interest At its worst this could manifest itself in a
severe infection of 'Iocalitis', where a diplomat serving
too long at an overseas post came to be more
identified with the host country's interests than
Australta's' (Hayden 1996:387--8).
Nev9rtheless, it is ironic that Asian
exceptionalism has its roots in the
We~;l's Orientalist discourse, and is
stra,egically manipulated by Asian
politicians to exploit notions of a
common threat (the alien West) and
the enemy within (domestic political
opponents as 'un-Asian') ..The claim
that Asians are uniformly and culturally
different has provided leaders in
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia with
a useful, if artificial rationale for different
standards of human rights, freedom of
expcession and other universal
benchmarks. However, the suggestion
that Asians as a group have different
human values from the rest of the world
-and even the proposition thatvalues
are culturally specific - is a difficult one
to sustain (Bauer and Bell 1999,
Sen 1999, KingsbUry 2001 :33-<3,46).
A serious implication of
cultural relativism is the claim
that Australia should not judge
Jakarta:S behaviour by its
Western values.
A serious implication of cultural
relativism is the claim that Australia
should not judge Jakarta's behaviour by
its Western values. This argument leads
to El position of amoral indifference
about the fate of those beyond
Au~,tralia's borders, and encourages
governments to adopt the 'realist' view
that the internal political complexion of
a slate is no business of outsiders.
If there is one lesson Australia can learn
from its post-war regional history it is
the irrelevance of cultural differences
in tile development of, in particular,
commercial links. The establishment
of !\ustralia's most important trade
relationship with Japan is a reminder
of money's imperviousness to cultural
barriers. As economic globalisation
proceeds, the expansion of Australia's
economic links with the region depends
not on its perceived cultural identity but
on the country's industrial relevance.
The other significant error in Australia's
atti'!ude to Indonesia centres on
assumptions about territorial
boundaries. The secession and
fragmentation of nation-states is not
necessarily the same thing, though
they are both a normal feature of
international life. Just as independence
for Tibet would not break-up China,
neither would the separation of Aceh
or West Papua ineluctably 'Balkanise'
Indonesia. The secessionist movements
in Indonesia's eastern and western most
provinces are largely the product of
Jakarta's military brutality and economic
exploitation. The future shape of the
republic will depend on whether
these citizens still feel their bond
with Indonesian nationalism is worth
salvaging, and will not be decided by the
preferences of neighbours who reftexively
favour 'stability' in Indonesia regardless
of what is being stabilised there.
Thefuture shape ofthe republic
will depend on whether these
citizens still feel their bond with
Indonesian nationalism is
worth salvaging...
Canberra's stated preference for regional
stability and the status quo assumes an
immutability of political boundaries which
is historically rare. The perceived stasis of
boundaries in South East Asia fails to
take into account accommodations that
have occurred since 1945 (Kingsbury
2001: Ch. 1). The borders of the region
are largely a consequence of the colonial
era, and given the previously malleable
nature of regional politics there is no
inherent reason why boundaries should
remain intact for long.
To date, Australian strategic planners
have shown little understanding of the
processes by which recently drawn
political boundaries are quickly made
'non-negotiable', how modern traditions
and feelings about homelands are
invented for expedient political and
nationalist purposes (Hobsbawn and
Ranger 1992). When they contemplate
the destruction and suffering that have
resulted from the defence of existing
territorial boundaries, it might be
prudent for Australia's diplomats
and political leaders to adopt a more
open-minded approach to territoriality
than has been their custom.
State creation is not necessarily a
once-and-for-all event at the time of
decoionisation. And it is a mistake to
equate stability with a corrupt or brutal
status quo, which is inherently unstable.
Indonesia is a state more arbitrarily
constructed than most. At its base is
an ideological paradox; it inherited its
shape and form from a colonial system
widely considered illegitimate by
Indonesian nationalists. It's potential for
fragmentation is openly conceded by
the use of amned forces deployed to
suppress internal political dissent and
contain centrifugal forces rather than for
external defence. Indeed, without the
presence of a minatory function,
Indonesia would have changed shape,
and possibly disappeared, on a number
of occasions. It is this apparent
necessity for inclusive compulsion that
primarily defines the political character
of Indonesia, which stands in sharp
contrast to the Australian experience.




culture is highly constructed,
relatively arbitrary,
immature and coercive.
In this respect, the political distinctions
between Australia and Indonesia are
far more significant than the cultural
differences between them. Australia
is a participatory and representative
liberal-democracy. Indonesia's political
culture is highly constructed, relatively
arbitrary, immature and coercive. One
is voluntary, stable, predictable and
firmly wrthin the Western liberal tradition.
The other is militarised, politically fluid,
evolving and subject to internal
destabilisation. The two political
systems do not mesh easily because
of absent complementarities and
antithetical foundations.
I'J... way forward: Order
rather than stability
Trade, investment, tourism, education
and development assistance will
continue to secure links between
Australia and Indonesia, providing they
clo not directly impinge on the political
processes of either. But one further way
forward for Australia is to understand
and acknowledge structural political
differences, appreciate the value of
heterogeneity, and work in those areas
where there is mutual interest.
Differences should be acknowiedged
and faced in a courteous and
straightforward manner, rather than
hidden by obsequiousness or
submerged beneath artificial politeness.
This means explicitly rejecting claims of
irreconcilable cu~ural differences leading
to inevrtable clashes between Western
and non-Western civilisations, as forecast
by Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1996).
Instead, according to the 'rationalist
school' of Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and
Mam Watson, it is important to focus on
tile high degree of order which can exist
in a global environment.
Flationalists have argued that a high
cegree of order and cooperation can
exist between states wrth very different
cu~ures and ideclogies can come
together in a 'society of states' because
they share a belief that international
society is the only legitimate fomn of
world polrtical organisation. A pragmatic
need to co-exist is suffcient to produce
what Bull called a 'diplomatic culture'-
tllat is, a system of conventions and
instrtutions which preserve order between
states with radically different aspirations
and domestic complexions. According
to John Vincent, this international society
is 'functional' or utilrtarian rather than
'cu~ural' (see Burchill 2001:107).
The foundations of international order,
according to Bull, requires every society
to protect the three 'primary goals' of
(a) placing constraints on the use of
force, (b) upholding property rights,
and (c) ensuring agreements are kept.
From this base, transcultural values and
ethical standards can be progressively
developed between states. Where there
is divergence between Australia and
Indonesia on these criteria, Australia
can and should maintain its focus on
these primary goals. The failure by one
interlocutor to adhere to international
norms does not imply that the other
should do likewise, or that the
maintenance of primary goals is
in any way compromised.
Importantly, an open dialogue which
places emphasis on order rather than
stability, can bridge many of the
differences between states such as
Australia and Indonesia. Diplomacy
should be the means through which the
different, the suspicious and even the
hostile reach some common ground.
Appeasement or estrangement is a
false dichotomy, especially within this
particular bilateral relationship (on the
rationalist tradition in International
relations, see Linklater, in Burchill 2001).
Michael Doyle correctly points out that
modern liberal states eschew violence
in the conduct of their relations, but he
also reminds us that liberal democracies
retain a healthy appetite for conflict with
authoritarian states. On the important
question of how liberal states should
therefore conduct themselves with
non-liberal states, prominent liberals
such as Doyle and Francis Fukuyama
are surprisingly silent (Doyle 1986,
1997, Fukiyama 1992).
John Rawls, on the other hand, is
concerned with the extent to which
liberal and non-liberal peoples can be
equal participants in a 'Society of
Peoples'. He argues that principles
and norms of international law and
practice can be developed and shared
by both liberal and non-liberal or
decent hierarchical societies, without
an expectation that liberal democracy
is the terminus for all. The guidelines
and principle basis for establishing
harmonious relations between liberal
and non-liberal peoples under a
common law-the extension of a
general social contract idea- takes
liberal international theory in a more
sophisticated direction because it
explicitly acknOWledges the need for
utopian thought to be realistic. This is
the plane on which Australia-Indonesia
relations can be broadened and
deepened, providing certain basic
conditions are met (Rawls 1999).
Rawls outlines the 'fair terms' for political
cooperation between liberal and
non-liberal peoples. The challenge for
liberal peoples is to recognise non-liberal
peoples as equal participating members
in good standing of the 'Society of
Peoples', with certain rights and
obligations, but with no requirement
that they become liberal. The West
cannot demand that other societies
live according to its moral conventions,
though it can and should expect legal
and constitutional consistency.
The challenge for liberal
peoples is to recognise
non-liberal peoples as equal
participating members in
good standing ofthe 'Society
ofPeoples '...
In fact the idea of limited power and
respect for the rule of law contained
within the idea of 'constitutionalism',
'which is present within, but not entirely
synonymous with, liberal democracy',
may be one way forward (Unklater
1993:33). According to Rawls, the
criteria for mutual respect and tolerance
between liberal and decent h',erarchical
societies - which together Rawls calls
'well ordered societies' - need not be
exclusively Western or liberal. A decent
hierarchical society should:
• not have aggressive aims and
recognise that it must achieve its
legitimate goals through diplomacy
and trade - it must honour the laws
of peace and respect the different
political and social orders of other
societies
• have a system of law which respects
human rights and imposes duties
and obligations on all citizens in the
territory - the focus should be on
procedural freedoms-to life, liberty
(conscience, religion, thought and
expression), property, and equality
before the law; and
• have judges and others who
administer the legal system who
sincerely believe the law is guided
by a common good idea of justice
(flawls 1999:64-8).
These principles avoid perceptions of
one imposing its values upon the other.
And they short-circuit the connection
between periodic political disputes and
invocations of irreconcilable cultural
differences.
A common basis of understanding
which is not susceptible to short-term
political crises, or overly dependent on
transient or authoritarian political
leaders, needs to be established
between Australia and Indonesia so
tha: the whole relationship is not put on
the line each time a diplomatic breech
occurs. Upon this base, many layers
of cooperation, mutual interest and
common concern can be erected. In
the past, the absence of shock
absorbers able to withstand normal
diplomatic potholes led to a feeling in
Canberra that good relations with
Jakarta had to be maintained at almost
all costs. Again, the focus should be on
what can be achieved within an ordered
cortex1, rather than the preservation of
stability and the need to please.
Rawls' principles do not apply to
relations between liberal states and
'outlaw states', 'societies burdened by
unfavourable conditions' or 'benevolent
absolutisms'. If it is optimistic to
describe contemporary Indonesia as a
'well ordered' and 'decent hierarchical
society', two points need to be made.
First, few societies have to confront,
simJltaneously, a crisis of legitimacy
in the system (political order) and the
regime (leadership). The etection of
Me!lawati Sukarnoputri to the
pre:,idency via a democratic vote of
the ftoor of the parliament in 2001 may
hav" only temporarily settled the issue
of regime change in Indonesia.
DeEper questions also hang over the
legitimacy of the system. Do the
methods by which the state maintains
itself in fact define the state? Can a
brutal state which places a premium
on the coercive unity of the state ever
develop along democratic lines? Can
the political elite in Jakarta expect that
the people will voluntarily comply with
their demands or will coercion be
required to sustain their legitimacy, as
in the past? These questions go to the
heart of Indonesian polity, and are a
major point of divergence between
Australia and Indonesia.
Can a brutal state which
places a premium on the
coercive unity of the state
ever develop along
democratic lines?
In maintaining the state, contemporary
leaders of Indonesia will find it
increasingly difficult to rely on earlier
modes of legitimation. Attempts
to reinvent 'monarchy' (traditional
legitimacy) by Sukarno and Suharto
ended in chaos. Cults of personality
(charismatic legitimacy) are also unlikely
to work without becoming 'routinised'.
The material aspirations of the masses
are not being met as fully now as they
were a decade ago (eudaemonic
legitimacy). And locating themselves
in the nationalist, anti-colonial tradition
(official nationalist legitimacy) won't
provide leaders with the same
resonance as in the past. The
prospects of a novel vanguard (new
tradition legitimacy) or relying on the
achievement of long-sought aims
such as independence (goal-rational
legitimacy) are also not likely to induce
mass support.
Increasingly, Indonesia's contemporary
rulers will need to rely on legal-rational
legitimacy- the rule of law, participatory
values, freely contested elections and
popular consent - if they are set aside
the seemingly permanent threat of
system failure and legitimation crisis. The
ex1ent to which they achieve this, as well
as other major challenges, such as the
depoliticisation of the armed forces and
the independence of the judiciary, will
largely determine whether Indonesia can
be fairly described as a 'well ordered
society' (see Holmes 1993:&-1 9).
Secondly, even if Indonesia falls short
of these criteria now, Australia will need
to continue to encourage it to move in
this direction. Political cultures are rarely
static for long, so encouragement
towards becoming 'well ordered society'
are likely to enhance Indonesia's internal
and external opportunities.
Tolerating difference
It cannot be assumed that the Western
path to modernity will ultimately
command universal consent, and
Australia needs to accept that Indonesia
could follow a different route. The value
and advantages of liberal democracy
should nevertheless be actively
promoted to those within the
Indonesian polity striving for higher
levels of political development, but in
ways that doesn't lecture or hector.
The success of the bilateral
relationship is too often
narrowly measured against
the temperature ofofficial
ties, which in turn comes
to be defined as 'the whole
relationship '...
Similarly, both countries should seek to
participate in each other's civil society
and develop links which can prosper in
the public space of non-governmental
and non-military domains. The success
of the bilateral reiationship is too often
narrowly measured against the
temperature of official ties, which
in turn comes to be defined as 'the
whole relationship'. Government to
government relations are only one
aspect of a much broader and deeper
set of associations.
While it continues to be necessary for
Australia to engage in regional trade
and investment, foreign policy should
not be predicated on regional
acceptance or an emphasis on
Australia's 'regional identity'. This
approach presupposes the need for
cultural adjustment if Australia is to find
a sense of belonging, when this is both
domestically unpopular and ignores the
appeal of Australia's distinctiveness in
East Asia and beyond ( see, for
example, Fitzgerald 1997, Mackie 2001 :
a9, 93). Meaningful engagement will
result from neighbourly relevance to
regional concerns, rather than contrived
identity politics. Engagement must be
tangible, sought on equal terms, and not
conducted in a fawning or craven way.
Exclusion from regional fora such as the
ilSEAN + 3 group, for example, must be
understood as a short-term political
t3ctic rather than a long-term cultural
objection.
In moments ofglobal crisis,
Canberra spolicy process
defaults to the trans-Pacific
alliance rather than to a
common South East Asian
approach...
flustralia's reaction to the terrorist attacks
of 11 September 2001 indicates that
Canberra retains a limited regional focus.
lhe Howard Government's failure to
consu~ with other governments in the
region prior to making a military
commitment to the US-led coalition was
strikingly reminiscent of the Hawke
Government's response to Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait in 1990. In moments of global
crisis, Canberra's policy process defaults
to the trans-Pacific alliance rather than to
e common South East Asian approach,
clespite almost two decades of official
'regional engagement'.
P,ustralia has two great advantages in
forming regional relationships; the
secular and multicultural nature of
P,ustralian society. In theory it is better
prepared for engagement with such a
heterogeneous region as East Asia than
virtually any other state. And yet
Canberra has failed to develop these
and other features of contemporary
P,ustralian society. And just as it should
avoid misleading representations of the
Orient in European culture, Australia
should also seek to dissemble
i=erceptions in Asia of the West as a
monolithic and homogenous entity.
Foreign policy should not be reduced to
reactive problem-solVing. A productive
working relationship between Australia
and Indonesia should be seen as a




security dialogue, institutional ties, and
so on, and not be elevated to a policy
objective per se.
A more sophisticated understanding of
each other's political agenda is also
needed. The breakdown of co-operation
on the issue of asylum seekers and
people smuggling from Indonesia to
Australia reflects a failure to understand
that its priorities are not axiomatically
shared in Jakarta, which faces much
greater difficulties on a number of fronts.
Canberra needs to take Jakarta into its
confidence and consult about potential
bilateral problems before presenting
them to a domestic audience and,
consequently, a bemused interlocutor.
Yet bilateral consultation does not
preclude openness. Foreign policy-
making in Australia would benefit
from greater levels of community
participation and transparency: the
failure to do so leads to the policy
debacles of the kind witnessed in
relation to East Timor between 1974
and 1999, while the secret diplomacy
which produced the 1995 security
agreement between Australia and
Indonesia should be abandoned
altogether. Only popular consent
confers legitimacy on public policy,
and the quiet councils of academia
and bureaucracy cannot be the sole
locations for foreign policy discussion.
Only when these criteria have been
met can relations between Australia
and Indonesia be fully normalised.
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